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COMMENTS

DAMAGES -

INJUNCTION BoND -

I2II

ATTORNEY's FEES As DAMAGES

- Frequently, when a litigant seeks to establish rights with respect to
particular property, it is possible for the opposing party so to act with
respect to the property involved, while litigation is pending, as to deprive the plaintiff of the substantial benefit of his remedy should he prevail. Consequently, on prima facie showing of right, courts of equity
will grant a temporary injunction to "freeze" the situation until the
rights of the parties are finally determined.1 Since the temporary injunction is issued without a final determination of -the rights of the

1

I HIGH,

INJUNCTIONS,§§

4, 5, 7, 8, 13 (1905).
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parties, the enjoined party is deprived of dominion over the subject
matter before it is finally decided that dominion is not rightfully his.
Therefore, should he ultimately prevail in the action, he is deprived
of whatever benefits he might have gained through the exercise of his
rights in connection with the subject matter during the interim between
the issuance of the temporary injunction and the final hearing. 2 Courts
of equity, recognizing this source of hardship, have required as a condition precedent to the issuance of a temporary injunction that the
plaintiff execute a bond conditioned on payment of all damages the
defendant might sustain by reason of the temporary injunction, should
it be finally determined that such injunction ought not to have been
issued.3 In an action on the injunction bond, it is obvious that such
injuries as are occasioned by defendant's being deprived of dominion
over the property are compensable. 4 However, a more difficult problem
is put to the court when it must decide whether attorney fees incurred
for procuring dissolution of the temporary injunction are similarly
within the condition of the bond. It is with this latter problem that this
comment is concerned. 5
I.

The United States Supreme Court early decided in the case of
Oelrichs v. Spain 6 that such fees could not be recovered. After pointing
2 Of course the enjoined party has the remedy of damages for malicious prosecution. Weinberg v. Goldstein, 241 Mass. 259, 135 N. E. 126 (1922); Newark Coal
Co. v. Upson, 40 Ohio St. 17 (1833). The dif!iculty of proving the elements of thii
cause of action make it of doubtful value. Occasionally other forms of action could
be utilized to compensate for injuries flowing from the restraint imposed, as for
instance where exercise of dominion over property of another by means of an injunction amounts to a conversion of the property, Anderson v. Wilson, {Tex. Civ. App.
1918) 204 S. W. 784; or where the obtaining of an injunction amounts to a breach
of contract, Tutwiler v. Burns, 160 Ala. 386, 49 So. 455 (1909).
3 City of Yonkers v. Federal Sugar .Refining Co., 221 N. Y. 206, I 16 N. E.
998 (1917). A bond is now required by statute in most jurisdictions. See, for instance,
Minn. Stat. {Mason, 1927), § 9388; Pa. Stat. Ann. {Purdon, 1931), tit. 12, § 2071.
In some states the requirement of a bond is discretionary with the court. See, for
example, Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith Hurd, 1936), c. 69, § 9; Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930),
§ 5899.
4 2 HIGH, INJUNCTIONS, § 1673 (1905).
5 An analogous problem arises when the obligee of an attachment or replevin bond
seeks to recover attorney fees. However, the courts handle these cases in the same way
in which they deal with the right of an obligee on an injunction bond, and the cases
seem to be used interchangeably as authority. For cases dealing with the recovery
in situations involving attachment bonds, see annotations in 25 A. L. R. 579 (1923)
and 71 A. L. R. 1467 at 1485 (1931). For cases involving replevin bonds, see annotation in 30 L. R. A. (N. S.)· 367 (19II).
6 15 Wall. {82 U.S.) 2II (1872). This was followed by a line of cases in the
federal courts. Sullivan v. Cartier, 77 C. C. A. (9th) 448, 147 F. 222 (1906);
Lindeberg v. Howard, 77 C. C. A. {9th) 23, 146 F. 467 (1906); Covington County,
Alabama v. Stevens, 167 C. C. A. (5th) 498, 256 F. 328 (1919).
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out that in other actions such as covenant, debt, and assumpsit, expenditures for legal services are not awarded as damages, and that with
respect to expensa litis the litigants are customarily on a footing of
equality, the court proceeded to bolster its position by stating:
"There is no fixed standard by which the honorarium can be
measured. Some counsel demand much more than others. . • .
More counsel may be employed than are necessary. When both
client and counsel know that fees are to be paid by the other party
there is danger of abuse. A reference to a master, or an issue to a
jury, might be necessary to ascertain the proper amount, and this
grafted litigation might possibly be more animated and protracted than that in the original cause. It would be an office of
some delicacy on the part of the court to scale down the charges,
as might sometimes be necessary." 7
The same attitude was thereafter taken by a few state courts,8 which
bolstered their result by construction of the word "damages" in the
bond or in the statute requiring bond. One construction frequently made
is that the function of the bond is to compensate for the cessation of
legal rights pending the litigation whereby the enjoined party's dominion over the property is suspended. If, by reason of this deprivation
of use, the restrained person su:ffers loss, the bond is his source of
indemnification, but attorney fees are regarded as beyond the scope of
such bond.9
The large majority of states, however, refuse to follow the federal
1

Oelrichs v. Spain, 15 Wall. (82 U.S.) 211 at 231 (1872).
Oliphant v. Mansfield & Co., 36 Ark. 191 (1880); Barrett v. Bowers, 87 Me.
185, 32 A. 871 (1895); Wood v. State, 66 Md. 61, 5 A. 476 (1886); Midgett v.
Vann, 158 N. C. 128, 73 S. E. 801 (1912); Sensenig v. Parry, 113 Pa. St. 115, 5 A.
11 (1886); Kemp v. Miller, 166 Va. 661, 187 S. E. 99 (1936); Crowley v. Robinson, (Tenn. Ch. App, 1898) 46 S. W. 461; Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. v. Ware, 74
Tex. 47, I I S. W. 918 (1889); Carpenter v. First Nat. Bank of Sour Lake, (Tex.
Civ. App. 1908) 114 S. W. 904.
9
Wisecarver v. Wisecarver, 97 Va. 452 at 455, 34 S. E. 56 (1899): "We are of
opinion that the word 'damages' as used in this statute was not intended to cover an
allowance for counsel fees. . •• The statute did not contemplate a recovery on account
of those personal expenses such as every litigant is subjected to who is brought into
court by his adversary ..• but only such damages as flow directly from being stopped
in the exercise of the right enjoined." Cf. Jones v. Rountree, I I Ga. App. 181 at 184,
74 S. E. 1096 (1912): "Attorney's fees are generally not included in the term 'damages.' ••. in order for attorney's fees to be recovered by way of damages, it is necessary for the parties to use language clearly indicating that they had the payment of such
fees in contemplation when such contract was made." This argument was adopted in a
later federal case. See In re Farmers' Union Mercantile Co., (D. C. S. C. 1928) 26
F. (2d) 102.
8
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rule,10 and if the litigation terminates with the determination that the
temporary injunction was wrongfully issued,u the obligee of the bond
is granted a reasonable 12 allowance for necessary counsel fees he has
become obligated to pay 13 for procuring a dissolution of the temporary
injunction. These courts, while recognizing that in the ordinary suit
where no temporary injunction is involved each party must bear his
own costs of litigation, distinguish the situation under present discussion principally on two grounds. One reason advanced for the majority
view is that the payment of his adversary's counsel fees is regarded
somewhat in the nature of a penalty imposed on the plaintiff for having resorted to the summary remedy of the temporary injunction,
thereby restricting the defendant in the use of his property and compelling him to employ legal aid to rid himself of the wrongfully imposed restraint. There exists a feeling that an indiscriminate resort
to such summary and bridling relief should be discouraged. The
Florida court 14 typically expressed this sentiment when it asserted,
"It seems just and right that when a party asks the interposition
of the power of the courts, in advance of a trial on the merits of
the cause, to deprive the defendant of some right or privilege
10 Jackson v. Millspaugh, IOO Ala. 285, 14 So. 44 (1893); Mason Dry Goods
Co. v. Ackel, 30 Ariz. 7, 243 P. 606 (1926); Frahm v. Walton, 130 Cal. 396, 62 P.
618 (1900); Marks v. Columbia Yacht Club, 219 Ill. 417, 76 N. E. 582 (1905);
Fountain v. West, 68 Iowa 380, 27 N. W. 264 (1886); Garden Plain Farmers' Elevator v. Kansas Wheat Growers Assn., 128 Kan. 218, 276 P. 799 (1929); Hinton v.
Perry County, 84 Miss. 536, 36 So. 565 (1904); Alliance Trust Co. v. Stewart,
n5 Mo. 236, 21 S. W. 793 (1893); Noble v. Arnold, 23 Ohio St. 264 (1872);
McLennon v. Fenner, 19 S. D. 492, 104 N. W. 218 (1905); Steel v. Gordon, 14
Wash. 521, 45 P. 151 (1896); Littleton v. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, 91 P. 832 (1907).
u Where the dissolution of the temporary injunction is made ·on final hearing on
the merits, it is prima facie evidence that the issuance was wrongful. Western Fruit &
Candy Co. v. McFarland, 188 Iowa 204, 174 N. W. 57 (1919).
12 That failure to allege and prove the reasonable value of the attorney fees is
fatal. See Reece v. Northway, 58 Iowa 187, 12 N. W. 258 (1822).
13 In California merely incurring an obligation to pay counsel fees is insufficient.
They must have actually been paid. Willson v. McEvoy, 25 Cal. 169 (1864). Elsewhere the rule is otherwise, and liability for the payment of counsel fees, without
actual payment, is adequate. Lambert v. Alcorn, 144 Ill. 313, 83 N. E. 53 (1893);
Wittich v. O'Neal, 22 Fla. 592 (1886); Underhill v. Spencer, 25 Kan. 71 (1881);
Berne v. Maxham, 82 \Yash. 235, 144 P. 23 (1914).
14 Wittich v. O'Neal, 22 Fla. 592 at 599 (1886). Cf. Buford v. Keokuck Northern Line Packet Co., 3 Mo. App. 159 at 172 (1876): "The principle upon which
counsel-fees are allowed upon dissolution of an injunction ••• is based upon the
fact that defendant has been compelled to employ aid in getting rid of an unjust
restriction forced upon him by the act of the plaintiff. If there had been no temporary
injunction, there would have been no restriction upon the defendants' enjoyment of
their legal rights. . • • But the defendants could have gone on, from beginning to
end, and even after, without deprivation or interruption of any privilege."
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claimed by him, even though temporarily, that if on investigation
it is found that the plaintiff had no just right either in the law or
the facts to justify him in asking and obtaining from the courts
such a harsh and drastic exercise of its authority, that he should
indemnify the defendant in the language of his bond for 'all
damages he might sustain'. . . ."

In the second place, these courts which grant a recovery of counsel fees
advance a reason which combines an element of judicial construction of
the term "damages" with the factor of causal relationship. It is said that
inasmuch as the bond is conditioned to pay all damages sustained by
the enjoined party by reason of the wrongful issuance of the temporary
injunction, fees for legal services are a proper subject of consideration
in estimating the damages incurred, being as direct and immediate a
loss as any other.15
2.

Digressing momentarily from the broader problem of the propriety
of granting attorney fees in any event, an examination of the cases in
those jurisdictions where a recovery of attorney fees for procuring
dissolution of the injunction is permitted reveals a further difficulty
when the temporary injunction is dismissed as an incident to the disposition of the case on its merits. Two situations have caused the courts
special difficulty. One is where the temporary injunction is incidental
or ancillary to the general relief sought by the plaintiff in the main
action; the other is where a permanent injunction is the sole or principal relief sought in the main action. In the former situation nearly all
the courts take the position that counsel fees expended for services
in defense of the general suit on the merits are not recoverable. 16 But
such fees as are earned by particular services directed to dissolution of
the temporary injunction are recoverable. Thus, where the plaintiff
in an action to recover certain drafts, alleged to have been wrongfully
held by the defendant, obtained a temporary injunction restraining
disposition of the drafts, and on a final hearing it was adjudged that
defendant was actually owner of the drafts, the defendant could not, in
a suit on the bond, recover his attorney fees expended for a general
15 Bolling v. Tate, 65 Ala. 417 at 426 {1880): "it would seem that all necessary and proper expenses incurred to procure the dissolution, or to prevent its re-instate-

ment ••• are the natural and proximate result of the wrongful suing out of the injunction, and are recoverable as damages."
16 Church v. Baker, 18 Colo. App. 369, 71 P. 888 (1903); Walker v. Pritchard,
135 Ill. 103, 25 N. E. 573 {1890); Robertson v. Smith, 129 Ind. 422, 28 N. E.
857 (1891); Trester v. Pike, 60 Neb. 510, 83 N. W. 676 (1900).
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defense of the action. 11 Likewise, where plaintiff claimed possession of
land and obtained a preliminary injunction restraining the defendant
from evicting the plaintiff, and on :final hearing the right to immediate
possession was determined to be in the defendant, thus dissolving the
preliminary injunction, it was held that the defendant could not recover
his counsel fees. 18
On the other hand, where the principal relief desired is a permanent injunction, the courts are in disagreement on the question whether
attorney fees can be recovered when the temporary injunction is dissolved by a dismissal of the main action at a :final hearing on the merits.
Some of the courts allow recovery of all counsel fees on the basis that
the services rendered in the defense of the suit are the same as those
that would be rendered on a motion to dissolve the temporary injunction, and that the services are directed towards preventing the temporary injunction from becoming permanent, hence are a consequence
of the issuance of the temporary writ.19 Those jurisdictions which reach
the contrary result do so on the grounds that the services rendered are
not directed towards the dissolution of the temporary injunction but
in defense of the main action for the permanent injunction, and that
the costs of services would be the same whether or not a temporary
injunction had issued.20 In Kentucky a unique rule prevails-that where
the injunction is merely in aid of the relief sought, attorney fees may
be recovered; but where a permanent injunction is the relief sought
attorney fees are not awarded in an action on the bond. 21

3.
To return to the general problem here concerned, it is apparent
that many of the arguments either in favor of granting attorney fees or
in opposition thereto are easily answered, depending of course on
17
Langworthy v. McKelvey, 25 Iowa 48 at 51 (1868): "In this case the prayer
for the injunction was merely auxiliary or incidental to the relief sought in the principal matter in controversy. The dissolution of the injunction would not dispose of the
case, for plaintiffs therein had equities which they could enforce, if successful, whatever the fate of their injunction. If they had commenced their action without asking
an injunction, as they might, and had failed, there can be no pretense that defendants
(the present plaintiffs) could have recovered compensation or damages for counsel fees
in, defending that action. • • • The bond was conditioned to pay damages sustained
by reason of the issuing of the writ, not by reason of the bringing of the action."
18 Mims v. Swindle, 124 Miss. 686, 87 So. 151 (1921).
19
Swan v. Timmons, 81 Ind. 243 (1881); Loofborow v. Shaffer, 29 Kan. 415
(1883); Holloway v. Holloway, 103 Mo. 274, 15 S. W. 536 (1890).
20 San Diego Water Co. v. Pacific Coast Steamship Co., IOI Cal. 216, 35 P. 651
(1894); Thurston v. Haskell, 81 Me. 303, 17 A. 73 (1889); Olds v. Cary, 13 Ore.
362, IO P. 786 (1886).
21 Holt's Admr. v. Johnson, 247 Ky. 180, 56 S. W. (2d) 962 (1933); Holliday
v. Sphar, 274 Ky. 556, n9 S. W. (2d) 656 (1938).
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which result the court wishes to obtain. The rationale of the Supreme
Court in Oelrichs v. Spain 22 is not particularly persuasive. It was there
suggested that the practice of granting counsel fees might lead to abuse.
Yet it would seem that this difficulty is overcome by limiting recovery
to those fees which are necessary and reasonable. While the problem
of determining what fees would be reasonable may prove difficult, it
would seem no more insurmountable than the assessing of reasonable
damages in any other case. The sum which would compensate a plaintiff in a personal injury action, as for instance for loss of limb, is far
more difficult to ascertain than the sum that would be a reasonable fee
for rendering legal services. And there is the additional consideration
that the task of the jury in setting reasonable fees is measurably facilitated by the testimony of expert witnesses, such as other lawyers, as to
what would constitute a reasonable fee in a particular case. The
Supreme Court argued further that recovery of counsel fees should be
denied because it would increase litigation. However, if by hypothesis
the enjoined party is entitled to his attorney fees, the fact that the
court must assume additional burdens would not appear a valid reason
for denying that which rightfully belongs to the injured party.
On the other hand, the customary arguments for allowing attorney
fees are equally unconvincing. The fact that the enjoined party has
been deprived of dominion over his property by the temporary injunction should not be determinative. The bond wiII clearly cover any loss
suffered by reason of such deprivation, and since the bond does compensate for the fettering of the property, the case where the temporary
injunction is utilized is not distinguishable from the ordinary action
wherein legal fees are traditionally unrecoverable. It is further argued
that because of the harshness of the injunctive remedy, its use should
be in.liibited and unnecessary resort thereto deterred. The answer to
such an argument is that the prospect of paying whatever damages are
occasioned by the suspension of the enjoined party's legal rights would
seem a substantial and sufficient deterrent to a promiscuous resort to
the temporary injunction. If it be asserted that because the bond is
conditioned to pay "ail damages" incurred by the enjoined party by
reason of the temporary injunction, the obligation therefore necessarily
includes attorney fees, the retort proper is that such argument merely
assumes the point in issue-the meaning of the phrase "all damages."
The construction placed on the ambiguous term "damages" wiII depend
on what the court conceives the purpose of the bond to be. If one begins
with the hypothesis that the purpose of the bond is to include counsel
fees, it is a relatively simple matter to grant recovery of such fees; but
22

15 Wall. (82 U. S.) 211 (1872).
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conversely, if one begins with the hypothesis that the purpose of the
bond is only to compensate for the restraint imposed, a construction of
the word "damages" so as to exclude counsel fees can with equal
facility be attained.

4.
Unlike the English practice, the traditional view in this country
imposes on each suitor his own burden of litigation.28 This approach
is so long-standing that in the ordinary action a court has no choice
but to deny the successful party any attorney fees. It is difficult to discern any valid basis upon which to distinguish the ordinary case from
the one wherein a preliminary injunction has been obtained. Counsel
fees, being necessary in both cases, would appear to be no more onerous
in the injunction case. If there are baseless actions, there is no reason to
believe they are more prevalent in the injunction cases. The only existing ground on which to distinguish the two types of cases is that the
enjoined defendant may suffer loss through the restricted use of his
pr9perty. But this is adequately attended to by the bond itself. The
only remaining inference is that, notwithstanding the orthodox approach to recovery of attorney fees, when a court is confronted with an
action on an injunction bond the presence in the bond of the loose term
"damages" a:ffords an occasion for construction, in which process opportunity for partial reconsideration of the whole problem is presented. If the court is of the opinion that a party who has been compelled to litigate to vindicate his rights should be compensated for the
actual costs of that litigation, the occasion furnishes a chance to award
attorney fees to the enjoined defendant. On the other hand, if the court
is impressed ~th the arguments in favor of the traditional view that
doubtful claims should be submitted to the courts and that proper litigation should be encouraged by dividing the hazards, rather than discouraged by threatening the prospective litigant with the entire costs of
the contemplated contest in event he should lose, then the court will
adhere to the accepted practice of interpreting the word "damages" so as
to exclude the recovery of counsel fees. In view of the uncertainty of
this law on this point, it would appear that, if the defendant desires
attorney fees to be included in the sums recoverable on the bond, express stipulations therefor should be inserted in the bond itself.

Harold P. Graves
Raymond H. Rapaport
23 As to recovery of attorney fees in the ordinary suit, see McCormick, "Counsel
Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element of Damages," 15 MINN. L.

REV. 619 (1931).

